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varying the shape of the seller’s cost function. Consistent with the theory, we find that quantity
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Introduction

The topic of large-buyer discounts has generated considerable interest among antitrust policymakers, business journalists, and academic economists. The conventional wisdom is that large buyers
are somehow better bargainers than small buyers in price negotiations with a seller. Theoretical
analyses of such a bargaining model (Horn and Wolinsky 1988, Stole and Zwiebel 1996, Chipty
and Snyder 1999, Inderst and Wey 2003, Raskovich 2003) concluded that large-buyer discounts
are not guaranteed but depend on the curvature of the total surplus function over which the parties
bargain.
Figure 1 captures the logic behind the theoretical argument. Suppose for simplicity that buyers
are final good consumers or are downstream firms which sell their output on separate markets.
The total surplus over which the parties bargain, W (Q), is equal to total benefits (downstream
consumer surplus or revenue) minus total costs (upstream and downstream production costs) as
a function of the quantity, Q, sold to buyers who reach an agreement with the seller. Suppose a
buyer with demand for q units trades with the seller. Assuming that others come to an efficient
agreement with the seller, the buyer may be regarded as the marginal player, contributing marginal
surplus A to the total. In Figure 1A, in which the total surplus function is concave, A is quite
small, and so whatever the sharing rule implicit in the bargaining process, the buyer will not
obtain very much surplus per unit. Now consider a second buyer who is twice as big as the
first, having demand for 2q units. The relevant marginal surplus over which the large buyer and
seller bargain becomes A + B, which is much greater per unit than A due to the concavity of the
surplus function. The large buyer’s greater per-unit surplus translates into a lower per-unit price
than paid by the small buyer.
Contrast this result with the case of a linear total surplus function in Figure 1B. Taking the
small buyer to be the marginal player, the surplus over which he bargains to satisfy his q units of
demand is A. Taking the large buyer to be the marginal player, to fulfill his 2q units of demand,
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he bargains over the surplus A + B, which is twice as large as A by the linearity of the surplus
function. Thus, the large and small buyer contribute the same marginal surplus per-unit and, as
a result, pay the same per-unit price.
The case of a convex total surplus function in Figure 1C is more complicated. The surplus
over which the small buyer bargains, A, is much larger per unit than that over which the large
buyer bargains, A + B. Hence we might expect large-buyer premia to emerge in equilibrium.
However, buyers’ contributions to surplus at the margin may be so high that the low prices they
pay as a result are insufficient to cover the seller’s costs. Multiple equilibria may arise with
one buyer or another paying more to prevent the seller from taking his outside option not to
produce. As our analysis in Section 3 will show, the set of equilibrium outcomes may range from
large-buyer premia, to prices independent of size, to large-buyer discounts.1
We test this theory in an experimental setting with three treatments corresponding to markets
with concave, linear, and convex total surplus functions. We generate curvature in the surplus
function by varying the seller’s marginal cost function, with increasing marginal costs leading to
a concave total surplus function, constant marginal costs leading to a linear total surplus function,
and decreasing marginal costs leading to a convex total surplus function.
Our results support the qualitative predictions of the theory for buyer-size discounts. Substantial large-buyer discounts are observed in the increasing marginal cost treatment (i.e., concave
total surplus function). Large buyers’ per-unit bids are 12 percent lower on average than small
buyers’ in this treatment. Sellers are also more likely to accept low bids from large buyers.
Thus, the large-buyer discount is larger, 14 percent, for accepted bids. In the cases of constant
and decreasing marginal costs, large and small buyers bid virtually the same per-unit price on
1

Alternative theories can generate buyer-size discounts in the absence of curvature of the surplus function. In Katz
(1987) and Scheffman and Spiller (1992), large buyers’ credible threat of backward integration limits prices charged
to them. In Snyder (1996, 1998), collusion is difficult to sustain in the presence of larger buyers. In McAfee and
Schwartz (1994), Dobson and Waterson (1997), and Chen (2003), downstream product market competition affects
firms’ negotiations with an input supplier. In Chae and Heidhues (2004) and DeGraba (2005), sellers favor large
buyers because of risk aversion.
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average, and sellers’ acceptance probabilities do not differ between them.
The fact that buyer-size discounts emerge in the cases predicted by theory and only those
cases is notable for several reasons. First, the underlying bargaining game involves a considerable amount of strategic uncertainty. Buyers must form conjectures about the simultaneous
bids of other heterogeneous buyers and the sequential rationality of the seller’s response to these
bids. The solution concept employed by the theoretical papers we test, typically subgame-perfect
equilibrium, effectively requires buyers to regard themselves as marginal in just the right way
depending on their size. The solution concept may not be a good predictor of observed outcomes
in our experimental setting. Indeed, observed buyer bids differ markedly from the corresponding
theoretical predictions for a number of cases (average bids are higher than theory predicts for
the constant and decreasing marginal cost treatments; small-buyer bids are lower than theory
predicts for the increasing marginal cost treatment). Despite the fact that the theory’s quantitative predictions concerning buyer-bid levels do not always hold in the experiments, the theory’s
qualitative predictions concerning buyer-size discounts do hold. Second, the experimental bargaining literature underscores that fairness and equity concerns may inhibit convergence to the
subgame-perfect equilibrium in settings such as the ultimatum game, even with repeated play and
high stakes (see, e.g., Slonim and Roth 1998). Despite the latitude for fairness considerations and
their ability to account for some observed divergences from equilibrium play in our experiments,
buyer-size discounts nonetheless emerge only where predicted by the theory.
To our knowledge, ours is the first direct test of the bargaining literature cited in the first paragraph. A few empirical papers have provided indirect tests (Ellison and Snyder 2002, Sorensen
2003). In the particular industries studied, large-buyer discounts were found in markets with
competing suppliers but not with monopoly suppliers. Although this result does not support the
bargaining literature cited above, it is not a direct rejection since the theory does not say largebuyer discounts must emerge in equilibrium—large-buyer discounts may not emerge if the total
surplus function is not concave. Chipty and Snyder (1999) estimate the curvature of the total
3

surplus function in cable television. Their estimates could be used to determine which case from
the bargaining theory applies to cable television, but their paper is not a direct test of the theory
since they have no data on prices paid by buyers.
While ours is the first experimental study of size as a source of buyer discounts, previous
experimental papers have studied other sources of buyer discounts. Ruffle (2000) examines
buyers’ ability to extract price concessions from competing sellers through demand withholding.
Davis and Wilson (2006) analyze the impact of strategic buyers on market outcomes after a seller
merger. Engle-Warnick and Ruffle (2005) show that two buyers achieve significantly lower prices
against a monopoly seller than do four buyers. None of these studies varies buyer size within a
market to measure buyer-size discounts, nor do they vary the shape of the total surplus function
to test the bargaining theories cited in the first paragraph, as we do in the present paper.

2

Experimental Design

To test for the relationship between the curvature of the surplus function and buyer-size discounts,
we designed three separate markets or treatments. The three treatments differ only in the shape of
the seller’s marginal cost function: a treatment with an increasing marginal cost function (IMC),
constant marginal cost function (CMC), and decreasing marginal cost function (DMC). In each
market, three buyers face a single seller. Two of the buyers are small, with unit demand for the
fictitious commodity, and the other buyer is large, with demand for two units.2
The buyers’ per-unit gross surplus is vi = 100, implying total gross surplus of Vi = 100 for
a small buyer and Vi = 200 for the large buyer. The seller can supply up to four units to the
buyers, so there is no binding capacity constraint. We control for the total cost of supplying all
2

Exogenous variation in buyer size allows for a simple, direct test of the theory but is also of practical relevance
for wholesale and intermediate-good markets in which a monopolist sells to independent local buyers whose size is
exogenous, reflecting varying downstream demand that each buyer faces in its local market. It is also of relevance
in markets in which buyers are chain stores whose size is determined by the number of retail outlets in the chain.
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four units by setting it equal to 80 in all three treatments. In the IMC treatment, the seller’s first
unit of production costs 0, the second unit costs 5, the third unit 15, and the fourth 60. The DMC
treatment uses the same numbers but in reverse order, so the first unit costs 60, the second unit
15, the third 5, and the fourth 0. In the CMC treatment, all four units have the same marginal
cost of 20. Combining the gross surplus and cost parameters yields the total surplus functions
graphed in Figure 2. The IMC treatment leads to a concave surplus function, CMC to a linear
one, and DMC to a convex one.
Twelve subjects participate in each experimental session. After reading the instructions, nine
of the subjects are randomly selected to play the role of buyer and three to play the role of seller.
This role remains fixed throughout the experiment.
The experiment consists of 60 rounds. In each round, all three markets are simultaneously
conducted (one IMC, one CMC and one DMC market) and with probability 1/3 each subject is
assigned to each of these markets. Thus, over the course of the 60-round experiment, all subjects
participate in each of the three markets. This design feature permits within-subject comparisons
across markets. Further, we used a random matching scheme. That is, the cohort of three buyers
and one seller that constitutes a market each round is randomly determined. We selected this
design feature to minimize repeated-game effects.3 A final random element in the design is the
designation of the large and two small buyers in each market. In a each market, two buyers are
randomly assigned the role of small buyer and one buyer the role of the large buyer in each of
the 60 rounds. The randomization scheme was performed once, prior to conducting any of the
experiments. The outcome of the randomization scheme was used for all six sessions. In this
way, we minimize between-session differences unrelated to behavior.
Trading takes place in a posted-bid market (first analyzed by Plott and Smith 1978), involving
the following sequence of events. First, each subject is informed of the market to which he has
3

Subjects who play together repeatedly even for a known, fixed number of rounds sometimes exhibit supergamestyle strategies, especially when the number of rounds is large (Selten and Stoecker 1986).
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been assigned and buyers are told whether they have a demand for one or two units that round.
Each buyer i then privately and independently chooses a bid, pi . A small buyer’s bid reflects
the price he is willing to pay to fulfill his unit demand, while the large buyer’s bid reflects the
per-unit price he is willing to pay for the bundle of two units. The large buyer is not given the
option of bidding separate amounts for the two units. The seller observes each buyer bid for
xi ∈ {1, 2} units and decides whether to accept (ai = 1) or reject (ai = 0) each one. The seller
does not have the discretion to supply one of the large buyer’s two units and reject the other.4
Buyers earn a payment equal to net consumer surplus ai xi (vi − pi ), and sellers earn a payment

equal to total revenue, i pi ai xi , minus the total cost of producing realized sales. Rejected bids
yield zero profit for the buyer and the seller; the seller does not incur the cost of unsold units.
Buyers’ valuations, seller costs, and the structure of the market are all made common knowledge by reading aloud the subjects’ instructions (available from the authors upon request). As
mentioned, subjects are told that cohorts would be randomized in each round, but were not told
with whom they were playing in a market. Feedback at the end of a round is minimal, again
with the aim of minimizing repeated-game effects or possible collusion. Each buyer learns only
whether his bid was accepted and his resulting payoff. Buyers do not observe any other buyers’
bids in their own or the other two markets, nor the sellers’ decisions on other bids.
At the completion of 60 rounds, all subjects were paid their experimental earnings in cash.
All subjects were given an initial endowment of 1,000 experimental “points” at the beginning
of the experiment. For every 250 points accumulated, the subject received £1. In total, 72
subjects participated in one of six experimental sessions conducted in the Experimental Economics
Laboratory at Royal Holloway, University of London. Each session, including the instructions,
4

Our choices to exclude large buyers from bidding different prices for its two units and sellers from supplying
large buyers with only one unit follow from an effort to simplify subjects’ task. These design features maintain the
same decision problem for the buyer whether large or small—he simply chooses one bid in either case—and the
same decision problem for the seller whether it faces a large or small buyer—he simply chooses to accept/reject the
bid in either case. With subjects playing in different treatments during a session, buyers alternating size and with
considerable strategic uncertainty about other buyers’ play, our experimental setting is already quite complex.
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five practice rounds, and a post-experiment questionnaire, lasted between 120 and 160 minutes.
On average, sellers earned £22 and buyers £19 each, including the initial endowment.

3

Theoretical Predictions

In this section, we derive the pure-strategy, subgame-perfect equilibria of our experimental game.
Our experimental setting differs slightly from any of the related theoretical papers because we
have adopted a different bargaining game. Rather than Nash bargaining (as in Horn and Wolinsky
1988, Chipty and Snyder 1999, and Raskovich 2003), or specific bargaining procedures giving
rise to the Shapley value (as in Stole and Zwiebel 1996 and Inderst and Wey 2003), we adopt
a simpler, and thus more tractable, bargaining game for an experimental setting, namely one in
which parties make take-it-or-leave-it offers. The equilibrium outcomes are qualitatively similar
to those in these other papers, but to derive the equilibria formally requires new propositions.
Since these propositions are of some independent interest, we first prove a general version of them,
and then proceed to derive their implications for the specific parameters used in our experiment.
Suppose there are N buyers indexed by i = 1, . . . , N. Let B = {1, . . . , N} denote the set of
buyers. Each buyer i has inelastic demand for xi ∈ N units, with Vi representing the buyer’s total
gross surplus for the bundle of xi units, and vi = Vi /xi representing the buyer’s gross surplus

per unit. Let X = i∈B xi. In the first stage of the bargaining game, each buyer i makes a
simultaneous offer of a bid per unit pi ∈ [0, ∞) to the single seller in the market. In the second
stage of the bargaining game, the seller decides whether to accept the bid of each buyer i, the
decision denoted ai ∈ {0, 1}. Equivalently, the seller chooses the set of accepted buyer bids

A = {i ∈ B|ai = 1}. Market sales are Q = i∈B ai xi .
Denote the seller’s total cost of producing Q by C(Q), its marginal cost of producing the last
of Q units by MC(Q) = C(Q) − C(Q − 1), its incremental cost of producing Q2 on top of Q1
Q2
by IC(Q2, Q1) = C(Q1 + Q2 ) − C(Q1) = j=1
MC(Q1 + j), and its average incremental cost
7

of producing Q2 on top of Q1 by AIC(Q2, Q1) = IC(Q2, Q1)/Q2 . Normalize C(0) = 0.
A full characterization of the subgame-perfect equilibria of this game for general parameter
configurations turns out to be quite complicated. In our experiments, we chose the parameters
so that all buyers are served in equilibrium. This simplifies the characterization of equilibria
considerably. We will thus restrict attention to the case in which all buyers are served for the
remainder of the section. The following proposition provides a sufficient condition for all buyers
to be served in equilibrium. The proofs of all propositions appear in the appendix.
Proposition 1. All buyers are served (formally, the set of buyers whose bids are accepted A
equals the set of all buyers B) in any pure-strategy, subgame-perfect equilibrium if, for all
i ∈ B,
(1)
vi > max MC(Q).
{Q≤X}

Condition (1) specifies that all buyers’ per-unit valuations exceed the marginal cost of producing
any unit. If condition (1) holds, but not all buyers are served in a particular outcome, the outcome
cannot be an equilibrium. Rather than earning zero profit, an excluded buyer could offer a bid
between its valuation and the incremental cost of being served that would be strictly profitable
for the seller to accept regardless of which other buyers were also being served. This accepted
bid would generate positive profit for the buyer. Note that the condition in the proposition is
satisfied by the experimental parameters since vi = 100, which is greater than 60, the highest
marginal cost of producing any unit in the experiment.
The next set of propositions characterize the pure-strategy, subgame-perfect equilibria in which
all buyers are served for marginal cost functions of different shapes.
Proposition 2. Suppose marginal costs are non-decreasing, i.e., MC(Q + 1) ≥ MC(Q) for all
Q ∈ {1, 2, . . . , X}. Buyer bids {pi |i ∈ B} form a pure-strategy, subgame-perfect equilibrium in
which all buyers are served if and only if, for all i ∈ B,
pi = AIC(xi, X − xi ) ≤ vi .

(2)

Proposition 3. Suppose marginal costs are strictly decreasing, i.e., MC(Q + 1) < MC(Q) for
all Q ∈ {1, 2, . . . , X}. Buyer bids {pi |i ∈ B} form a pure-strategy, subgame-perfect equilibrium
8

in which all buyers are served if and only if pi ≤ vi for all i ∈ B and, for all subsets S ⊆ B,
 

  
(3)
xi , X −
xi ≤
pi xi ≤ C
xi .
IC
i∈S

i∈S

i∈S

i∈S

Proposition 2 subsumes the cases of strictly increasing marginal costs and everywhere constant
marginal costs, which correspond to two of our experimental treatments, as well as marginal cost
functions that are strictly increasing over some regions and constant over others. In view of
Proposition 2, characterization of the equilibrium with all buyers being served under constant or
increasing marginal costs is quite simple. Each buyer bids an amount that exactly covers the
incremental cost of being served on top of the other N − 1 buyers’ purchases. Any less than
this and the seller would gain by rejecting the bid; any greater than this and the buyer could
profitably lower the bid and still not have it rejected by the supplier.
As Proposition 3 shows, characterization of equilibria under decreasing marginal costs is more
complicated. There is a continuum of equilibria. Within the bounds provided by condition (3),
any set of bids summing exactly to the total cost of serving all buyers forms an equilibrium in
which all buyers are served. The first inequality in (3) ensures that the seller does not have an
incentive to reject a subset of buyer bids. The second inequality in (3) ensures that a buyer does
not have an incentive to lower his bid because it would be rejected by the seller. To see this,
note that if a buyer deviated to a lower bid, the second weak inequality would become strict for
all subgroups containing the deviating buyer, implying that the seller would earn negative profit
if it accepted the bids of any subgroup containing the deviating buyer. The seller would earn
more (zero rather than negative profit) by simply rejecting all bids.
Figure 3 summarizes the implications of Propositions 2 and 3 in the case of our experimental
parameters. The 45-degree line represents equal average large-buyer and small-buyer per-unit
bids; large-buyer discounts are found in the region below the 45-degree line, and small-buyer
discounts above it. For the IMC treatment, Proposition 2 implies that small buyers bid psi =
AIC(1, 3) = 60 in equilibrium while the large buyer bids pl = AIC(2, 2) = 37.5. The seller
9

accepts all bids in equilibrium and earns 115, small buyers each earn a profit 40, and the large
buyer earns 125. The large buyer obtains a substantial discount of 22.5. For the CMC treatment,
Proposition 2 implies that the small buyers’ equilibrium bids, psi = AIC(1, 3) = 20, are the
same as the large buyer’s, pl = AIC(2, 2) = 20, and the seller accepts all bids and earns zero.
Thus, there is no buyer-size discount since the large and small buyers make the same per-unit bids
equal to the constant marginal cost. Small buyers each earn a profit of 80 while the large buyer
earns 160. In the DMC treatment, as Figure 3 indicates, there exists a continuum of equilibria.5
Equilibria may involve large-buyer discounts, small-buyer discounts, or equal per-unit prices for
large and small buyers. All buyers are served in equilibrium. Buyers’ payoffs depend on the
equilibrium; the seller earns zero in all cases.
To summarize the predictions for the three treatments, large-buyer discounts should be observed in the IMC treatment and no discounts observed in the CMC treatment. The DMC
treatment may exhibit a range of outcomes including no discounts. Average bids are predicted to
be higher in IMC than the other treatments. Only in the IMC treatment is the seller predicted to
earn positive profit; in the CMC and DMC treatments, buyers’ bids sum exactly to the seller’s
total cost of 80.

4

Results

In this section, we test the implications of the theory concerning buyer-size discounts based on the
six experimental sessions we conducted. Section 4.1 focuses on tests of the comparative-statics
predictions of the theory, that is, predictions of the theory for differences between large and small
buyers. Section 4.2 focuses on explaining observed deviations from equilibrium behavior.
5

Proposition 3 states that condition (3) must hold for all possible subsets of buyers. Translated into our experimental setting, for a subset of one small buyer, condition (3) implies 0 ≤ psi ≤ 60, for a subset of one large buyer
5 ≤ 2p ≤ 75, for a subset of two small buyers 5 ≤ ps1 + ps2 ≤ 75, for a subset of one large and one small buyer
20 ≤ 2p + psi ≤ 80, and for all the buyers 80 ≤ 2p + ps1 + ps2 ≤ 80. Combining these inequalities yields the set
of equilibria labeled DMC in Figure 3.
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4.1 Buyer-Size Discounts
Our analysis of buyer-size discounts in each of the three treatments (IMC, CMC, DMC) proceeds
by first examining the extent to which the discounts show up in descriptive statistics reported in
Table 1 and using the regression results in Table 2 to test whether the discounts are statistically
significant. Although the tables also report results based on all 60 rounds, we direct attention
to the last 30 rounds of play throughout the discussion in this subsection. This choice follows
from the insight that experimental data may be noisy in the early rounds as subjects familiarize
themselves with the environment and learn how rivals play. We will investigate these and other
dynamic effects more formally in the next subsection but note for now that all of the qualitative
results discussed in this subsection are robust to considering the entire 60 rounds of play.
Regarding the IMC treatment, the summary statistics in the first two rows of part (b) of Table 1
point to an appreciable large-buyer discount. The mean large-buyer bid is 39.5 (median = 40.0),
about five points less than the mean small-buyer bid of 44.8 (median = 45.0). The randomeffects regression in part (a) of Table 2 shows that this discount is statistically significant.6 The
standard errors are corrected for possible non-independence of observations across multiple rounds
of play for the same buyer (by clustering each buyer’s observations) and are robust to possible
heteroskedasticity (following White 1980). The regression includes dummy variables for the IMC
and DMC treatments, labeled IMC and DMC, respectively, with CMC as the omitted treatment.
To assess the magnitude of buyer-size discounts or premia, interaction terms between each of the
treatments and buyer size are included, IMC × LARGE, CMC × LARGE, and DMC × LARGE.
The dummy variable LARGE equals one for bids made by large buyers. The coefficient of –4.84
(significantly different from zero at the one-percent level) on the interaction term IMC × LARGE
in part (a) indicates nearly a five-point large-buyer discount in this treatment.
6

Our experimental design obviates the need for fixed buyer effects because the buyer’s size and the treatment
in which the buyer plays is chosen at random each round. Indeed, the coefficients on the variables of interest are
virtually identical across fixed- and random-effects specifications. A Hausman test cannot reject the appropriateness
of random effects.
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The existence and magnitude of the large-buyer discount in IMC are striking when contrasted
with the absence of buyer-size discounts in the other two treatments. Theory predicts that the
mean large- and small-buyer bids should be identical in the CMC treatment. The descriptive
statistics in part (b) of Table 1 bear this out: the mean large-buyer bid in this market is 34.6
(median = 35.0) compared to 34.5 (median = 35.0) for small buyers. In the random-effects
regression in part (a) of Table 2, the coefficient of –0.86 on CMC × LARGE is not significantly
different from zero. Turning to the DMC treatment, we again find no difference between large
and small buyers’ bids. The mean large-buyer bid for the DMC treatment reported in part (b)
of Table 1 is 40.9 (median = 40.0) compared to 40.2 (median = 40.0) for small buyers. In the
random-effects regression in part (a) of Table 2, the coefficient of –0.44 on the interaction term
DMC × LARGE is not statistically different from zero.
The results are if anything stronger if we consider the subsample of accepted bids. The
justification for focusing on accepted bids is that these would be the prices observed by the
empirical researcher in a typical non-experimental market; one would not observe prices for
trades that were not executed due to a breakdown in bargaining. Summary statistics for accepted
bids are provided in the last six rows of Table 1. Comparing the large- and small-buyer bids in part
(b) of the table for the IMC treatment shows that the mean large-buyer discount increases to about
seven points and the median rises to about nine points when just accepted bids are considered.
Similarly, the regression coefficient of –5.81 on IMC × LARGE in part (b) of Table 2 is larger
(by about one point) than the corresponding coefficient for all bids reported in column (a). By
contrast, the means and medians of large and small buyers’ bids remain virtually unchanged for
the CMC and DMC treatments when we restrict attention to accepted bids and the corresponding
regression coefficients measuring a buyer-size discount continue not to be significantly different
from zero.
We next turn to an analysis of the impact of buyer size on sellers’ acceptance decisions. In the
IMC treatment, theory predicts that the seller accepts a large buyer’s bid whenever it would accept
12

an equal small buyer’s bid, at least in the range of bids in our data set, but the converse is not
true.7 In the CMC treatment, theory implies that there should be no difference in the accept/reject
decision for large- and small-buyer bids since both provide the same per-unit surplus for a given
bid. There are no strong theoretical predictions for the DMC treatment in this regard because of
the multiplicity of equilibria.
The descriptive statistics in part (b) of Table 1 provide some evidence on the seller’s acceptance decision. Comparing the number of accepted bids in the last six rows of the table to the
total number of bids in the first six rows, the disproportionate number of rejected bids made by
small buyers in the IMC treatment stands out. For the other buyer types, rejection rates range
from two percent (large buyers in DMC) to 17 percent (large buyers in CMC). In the case of
small buyers in IMC, the rejection rate is 40 percent, with 143 out of 360 bids rejected. Compare
this with large buyers in the same treatment whose bids are rejected at the rate of only ten percent
(18 out of 180), despite bidding significantly lower than their small-buyer counterparts.
A more formal analysis of the seller’s accept/reject decision is provided by Figure 4. We
ran a probit to determine the reduced-form probability of seller acceptance as a function of a
buyer’s bid for each of the six different buyer-size/treatment combinations.8 To aid interpretation,
rather than report a table of coefficient estimates, we provide in Figure 4 a graph of the seller’s
acceptance decision based on coefficient estimates. As the figure shows, the seller acceptance
functions are similar for the large and small buyers in both the CMC and DMC treatments.
7
Consider equal large- and small-buyer bids p = ps1 = p. Let Qs2 ∈ {0, 1} be the quantity supplied to the
second small buyer. Both bids are accepted if p > IC(3, Qs2 ) and both are rejected if p < IC(1, Qs2 ). Accepting
the large-buyer bid and rejecting the small-buyer bid yields a profit of 2p − IC(2, Qs2 ). Accepting the small-buyer
bid and rejecting the large-buyer bid yields a profit of p − IC(1, Qs2 ). But 2p − IC(2, Qs2 ) > p − IC(1, Qs2 ) if
and only if p > M C(Qs2 + 2). Note that M C(Qs2 + 2) ∈ {5, 15} for our design. Since we do not observe any
small-buyer bids less than 15 in IMC, accepting the small buyer and rejecting the large buyer is never optimal for
the range of bids in our data set.
8
The dependent variable in the probit is an indicator for the seller’s accept/reject decision; regressors include a
full set of dummies for buyer-size/treatment combinations and interactions between these and the buyer’s bid. We
use the results based on the last 30 rounds of bids; results based on all rounds of bids are similar. All formal
statistical tests related to this probit cited below are based on robust standard errors from a population-averaged
panel-data model, clustering on sellers (to account for possible correlation in the errors for the same seller across
multiple rounds).
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However, the acceptance function for the IMC small buyers lies well below that of IMC large
buyers, indicating that the seller is much more likely to accept a large-buyer bid than an equal
small-buyer bid. The figure highlights the seller’s distinct treatment of IMC small buyers’ bids.
For example, a bid of 40 by a small buyer in the IMC treatment has less than a 50 percent chance
of being accepted, while this same per-unit bid is accepted with near certainty when submitted
by each of the other five buyer types. In all five comparisons of the probability of acceptance
with small buyers in IMC, the difference is significantly different from zero at better than the
one-percent level in pairwise χ2 tests.
To sum up, the results for buyer-size discounts are qualitatively consistent with the comparativestatic predictions of the theory. Large buyers bid lower and sellers accept these lower bids in the
IMC treatment. There are no price discounts and sellers’ acceptance behavior is alike across large
and small buyers in the CMC treatment. These findings are all predicted by the theory. Theory
predicts a broad range of possible outcomes for the DMC treatment, including the possibility that
large and small buyers pay equal per-unit prices and sellers’ acceptance behavior is alike across
large and small buyers. Consistent with this latter possibility, large and small buyers’ bids are
about equal in the DMC treatment in our experimental data and sellers’ acceptance behavior is
about the same across large and small buyers.

4.2 Explanations of Deviations from Equilibrium
While the theory correctly predicts the direction of buyer-size discounts in the experiment, there
remain some discrepancies between bid levels in certain treatments and the corresponding theoretical predictions that merit investigation. For ease of comparison, Table 3 juxtaposes the mean
bids from the experimental data from Table 1 and the theoretical predictions from Figure 3. In
the IMC treatment, the average large-buyer bid of 39.5 is close to the theoretical prediction of
37.5. The random-effects regressions from Table 2 can be used to provide a statistical test of the
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difference as well as the other differences discussed below in this section: the estimated largebuyer bid in the IMC treatment—given by the sum of the coefficients on the constant, IMC, and
IMC × LARGE from column (b)—is not significantly different from 37.5 at the ten-percent level
in a two-tailed t test. On the other hand, the average small-buyer bid of 44.8 is lower than the
theoretical prediction of 60, significantly different at the one-percent level. (Indeed, the absence
of buyer-size discounts in the CMC and DMC treatments coupled with small buyers’ belowequilibrium bidding in IMC make large-buyer discounts in this treatment all the more striking.)
While large and small buyer bids in the CMC treatment—34.6 and 34.5, respectively—are not
significantly different from each other, they are higher than the theoretical prediction of 20 for
both, significantly different at the one-percent level. Although large- and small-buyer bids in the
DMC treatment cannot be compared to their theoretical counterparts individually because there
is not a unique theoretical prediction for them, the average across large and small buyer bids
can be compared to theory. The average in column (a) of about 40 is higher than the theoretical
prediction of 20, significantly different at the one-percent level.
We begin with a preliminary analysis of whether the buyers, the sellers or both are responsible
for the discrepancies between bid levels and theoretical predictions. To help determine whether
buyer play is rational—“rational” will be used throughout the discussion in the narrow sense of
maximizing own monetary payoffs in a one-shot game—for each treatment and buyer-size combination, we calculate buyers’ monetary-payoff-maximizing best responses to others’ experimental
play. A divergence between mean bids and these best responses would suggest possible departures from buyer rationality. We use the results underlying Figure 4 as an input in the calculation.
Multiplying the acceptance probability from Figure 4 times the buyer’s payoff conditional on
acceptance for each bid level results in the expected buyer payoff function conditional on others’
experimental play, displayed in Figure 5. The peak of a function is a payoff-maximizing buyer’s
best response to others’ experimental behavior, recorded in column (c) of Table 3.
Comparing columns (a) and (c), we see a divergence between experimental best responses and
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mean bids in three of the six rows: for small-buyer bids in IMC and for large- and small-buyer
bids in DMC. This suggests some deviation from rational play on the buyer side at least in these
cases. On the other hand, comparing columns (b) and (c), experimental best responses diverge
from theoretical predictions in three of the six rows: for small-buyer bids in IMC and for largeand small-buyer bids in CMC. This raises the possibility of departures from rational play on the
seller side as well, as will be examined below.
More direct evidence on the rationality of seller play can be obtained from an analysis of
individual seller acceptance decisions. A sequentially rational seller would best respond to the
set of observed bids in each round (which do not necessarily correspond to the equilibrium bids
predicted by theory, as just seen). Focusing on the last half of the rounds in each session (periods
31–60), for each treatment we have 180 seller decisions to analyze (30 periods times six sessions)
involving 540 buyer bids. In the IMC treatment, 149 out of 180 sellers’ decisions (83 percent)
are rational. Half of the irrational decisions are acceptances of all three bids when the seller
should have rejected one small-buyer bid. In CMC (where sellers’ decisions on all 540 bids can
be analyzed separately), we found 481 rational seller decisions (89 percent). Seven of these are
rejections of bids less than 20. All 59 irrational decisions are rejections of bids larger than 20,
albeit relatively low bids: the average rejected bid was 28.7, significantly less than large and
small buyers’ average bids. No bid above 40 is rejected. Finally, in DMC, bids were sufficiently
high that it is rational for sellers to accept all bids in all cases. Out of 180 sets of decisions in
DMC, 170 are rational; ten involve an irrational rejection of at least one bid.
A number of possible factors may account for the departures from rational play by buyers
and sellers. Players may care about fairness in addition to monetary payoffs; they may make
calculation errors; they may slowly learn about others’ experimental play; they may manipulate
their short-run play in a dynamic strategy to affect future outcomes, and so forth. A preference
for fairness has some intuitive appeal as an explanation. For example, a preference for fairness
on the part of sellers might explain why they reject 59 bids in the CMC treatment greater than
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20: even though accepting would have increased sellers’ monetary payoff, the bids may have
been low enough to give them a small share of the payoff relative to the buyer. A preference for
fairness on the part of buyers might explain why they bid more on average in the DMC treatment
than the monetary-payoff-maximizing best responses, since the latter would leave the buyer with
a disproportionate share of the surplus relative to the seller.
To investigate more formally the importance of fairness relative to the other factors, we
estimate a structural fairness model. A variety of different theories of fairness have been proposed
(see Fehr and Schmidt 2006 for a survey). Perhaps the most influential is Fehr and Schmidt’s
(1999) model of inequality aversion. Unfortunately, even though the Fehr-Schmidt model is
relatively simple, it is still intractable to compute the equilibrium in our setting.9 We proceed
by estimating the model on sellers in isolation. Since sellers moves second in the stage game,
conditional on the bids they receive, their behavior can be characterized as a simple discretechoice problem.
Sellers must decide whether to accept or reject each of three bids, leading to a choice among
23 = 8 possible acceptance configurations. Seller i’s utility from choosing acceptance configuration k from among the eight possibilities, is
uik = xik −

αi 
βi 
ik
max(xjk − xik , 0) −
max(xik − xjk , 0) + ,
N −1
N −1
λ
j=i

(4)

j=i

where xik is seller i’s monetary payoff from decision k, αi measures the disutility from payoff
disadvantages relative to the buyers (indexed by j) from whom seller i receives bids, βi measures
the disutility from seller i’s payoff advantages relative to these buyers, ik is a logit error term, λ
is a term scaling the precision of the error, and N is the number of players in the market (four in
our experiments). Fehr and Schmidt’s (1999) model is reproduced in the first three terms on the
9

In our setting, the seller may accept multiple offers and the total surplus function is potentially nonlinear. The
sequential-move games for which Fehr and Schmidt (1999) explicitly derive equilibria all have the flavor of the
simpler ultimatum game.
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right-hand side of (4). Seller i enjoys a higher monetary payoff but dislikes inequality relative to
its transacting partners. Including separate coefficients α and β allows the disutility from earning
less surplus than transacting partners to potentially differ from the disutility of earning more.
The last term, ik /λ, has been appended to the Fehr-Schmidt model in the spirit of McKelvey
and Palfrey’s (1998) quantal response equilibrium. This last term allows for tractable estimation
of the model. It captures any sort of deviation from seller rationality including computation
errors and dynamic strategies to affect future play beyond the stage game. The smaller is λ, the
more important are these other factors relative to fairness in explaining deviations from seller
rationality.
Table 4 presents maximum-likelihood estimates of the α̂, β̂, and λ̂, assuming parameters
are constant in the population.10 Focusing on the results for all treatments in part (b) of the
table (using the last 30 rounds of data), estimates of both fairness parameters α̂ = 0.068 and
β̂ = 0.133 are positive, and β̂ is significantly different from zero. There is some instability
among the fairness parameters across treatments: β̂ is significantly greater than zero for most
subsamples, and α̂ is significantly positive in DMC.11
These estimates thus provide some evidence that fairness plays a role in deviations by sellers
from payoff maximization. However, analysis of the relative magnitudes of the estimated parameters suggests that the overall role of fairness is dwarfed by other factors. The error term
ik /λ, which in our setting has the interpretation of deviations from rational play caused by fac√
tors beside fairness, has a standard deviation of π/λ 6. Substituting λ̂ = 0.130, this standard
deviation equals 10. A standard deviation this high would be generated by adding noise in the
We also estimated (4) allowing α̂ and β̂ to vary across the 18 different sellers. The procedure failed to converge
or failed to generate an invertible covariance matrix for a number of the subsamples. For those that did (for
example, the subsample of all treatments and the last 30 rounds), a likelihood ratio test strongly rejected the equality
of parameters across sellers. The resulting λ̂ was quite close to that reported in Table 4, so the estimates in the table
provide a view of the importance of fairness relative to other factors on average in the sample.
11
The parameter instability across treatments indicates possible misspecification in the fairness model. Searching
for the best-fitting among the large set of alternative fairness models is beyond the scope of this paper. We estimated
several alternative models that produced a better fit than Fehr and Schmidt (1999), but the overall picture that
fairness plays only a limited role in explaining deviations from rationality was unchanged.
10
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form of an equal chance of adding or subtracting 10 points from each seller decision. A rise or
fall of 10 payoff points dominates any estimated fairness effects. For example, considering the
estimate α̂ = 0.068 (insignificantly different from zero, but we will still take the point estimate
for the sake of this exercise), for the seller to be willing to give up 10 payoff points, each buyer’s
advantage over the seller would have to be reduced by over 146 points (146 ≈ 10/α̂). This is an
order of magnitude greater than buyer-seller advantages observed on average in the data (18.1).
Similarly, considering the estimate β̂ = 0.133, for the seller to be willing to give up 10 payoff
points, each buyer’s payoff would have to be increased 74 points to narrow their shortfall relative
to the seller, over 2.5 times higher than seller-buyer advantages observed on average in the data
(29.5).
Another way to gauge the relative importance of fairness versus other factors in explaining
deviations from rationality is to look at the buyer side. Since sellers were selected randomly
from the pool of subjects, we can assume that their fairness parameters are representative of the
population, and thus that buyers share the same parameters.12 We will see how much a buyer’s
best responses to others’ experimental play changes if we alter the buyer’s utility function to reflect
this amount of fairness. The best response to others’ experimental play for a buyer with fairness
preferences can be computed following the same steps used to derive column (c) of Table 3
but substituting the new utility function. The resulting best responses are given in column (d).
Including fairness in the utility function hardly changes the best responses from column (c). The
greatest change is for small-buyer bids in IMC. Even there, the change of 1.4 points accounts
for only 14 percent of the discrepancy between the payoff-maximizing best response of 54.8 in
column (c) and the mean bid of 44.8 in column (a).
By this measure, at most 14 percent of players’ (specifically buyers’) deviation from rational
play is accounted for by fairness. Indeed, the raw data itself suggests limits to how much fairness
12

Given the instability of parameters across treatments, it is quite possible that estimates of buyers’ fairness
parameters would differ from those in Table 4. However, the exercise of simulating buyer best responses with these
fairness parameters still is a useful exercise to gauge the economic magnitudes of α̂ and β̂.
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would emerge from any empirical model. As mentioned, only a minority of observations involve
irrational play. Among these, fairness preferences do not seem to be consistent across treatments.
Irrational seller play in IMC consists of accepting bids that a payoff-maximizer would reject,
while in CMC it consists of rejecting profitable bids.
Some evidence on the contribution of other factors besides fairness to departures from rational
play comes from examining the λ̂. Restricting attention to the results for all treatments in Table 4,
and comparing λ̂ in part (a) to that in part (b), we see a substantial increase in λ between the first
and last 30 rounds, statistically significant at the one-percent level. This increase in λ, equivalent
to a fall in the scaled error ik /λ in equation (4), suggests that factors causing departures from
rational play other than fairness decline in importance as experimental play progresses. One
explanation would be that sellers make fewer computation errors as they learn to play the game
better over time. Another would be that as the end of the game draws nearer, there is less value
in distorting stage-game play in order to gain a dynamic advantage. For example, in a model in
which sellers’ fairness parameters αi are private information, a seller might reject more offers
than statically optimal in order to signal a high value of αi and raise buyer offers in future rounds.
Such signaling would be less useful over time as buyers’ posteriors on the distribution of fairness
parameters become tighter and as the future horizon over which to earn a return from signaling
shrinks. Since players were shuffled anonymously between markets, the benefit of such signaling
or other dynamic strategies is considerably reduced; but such strategies remain a possibility.
Comparing the λ̂ across treatments, the lowest value is 0.076 for the DMC treatment in part
(a) of the table, suggesting that factors other than fairness led to the biggest departures from
seller rationality in early-round play of the DMC treatment compared to others. This pattern is
consistent with computation errors. As suggested by the lengthy proof of Proposition 3, which
applies to the DMC case, compared to relatively shorter proof of Proposition 2, which applies
to the IMC and CMC cases, computations are more difficult for DMC than the other treatments,
with few shortcuts to the brute force method of computing the payoff from all eight acceptance
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configurations to ensure an optimal decision.13 On the other hand, it is hard to see why dynamic
strategies would be more important in the DMC treatment than others, although this possibility
cannot be ruled out in the absence of a general dynamic theory.
Table 4 provides evidence on the dynamics of seller behavior. Evidence on the dynamics
of buyer behavior is provided by Table 5, which reports a single random-effects regression of
bids on lagged bids and lagged seller rejections. Each regressor is interacted with a dummy
variable for the first 30 rounds of play (column (a)) and the last 30 rounds (column (b)), with
the difference between these two reported in the final column. The coefficient on “bid last round
played same treatment” falls significantly between the first and the second 30 rounds, whereas
the coefficient on “bid last round played same treatment and size role” increases significantly.
These opposite trends suggest that buyers learn the difference between markets and size roles
over time, playing more consistently within them and differentiating their strategies across them.
Buyers respond to rejections by increasing their bids. The response is sharpest for closely related
past experience (same size role and treatment). For example, the coefficient of 0.134 in the last
row of column (a) suggests that a rejection in the same size role and treatment leads to a 13.4
percent increase in a bid in the first 30 rounds of play. The buyer does respond to a rejection
in the last round even for unrelated roles although less so. A comparison of column (b) with
column (a) reveals that buyers respond less to rejections over time, a decline that is significant
in two of the three cases. This reduced sensitivity suggests that they become more confident in
their strategies and learn less from seller responses over time.
13

Among other shortcuts, in IMC and CMC, it is optimal for a payoff-maxmizing seller to accept all bids if each
exceeds the relevant marginal cost conditional on all others being accepted. This simple check does not suffice for
DMC, as can be shown in the example in which one small buyer bids 80 and the other two buyers bid 4 per unit
each.
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5

Conclusion

An accumulation of results from theoretical bargaining models links the existence of buyer-size
discounts to the curvature of the total surplus function over which the seller and buyers negotiate.
In theory, large-buyer discounts emerge if the total surplus function is concave; there are no
discounts if the total surplus function is linear, and a range of possible outcomes if it is convex.
We test the theory in markets in which large and small buyers bargain simultaneously with a
single seller. The markets differ in the curvature of the total surplus function. By varying the
seller’s marginal cost function, we obtain concave, linear, and convex surplus functions from
increasing, constant, and decreasing marginal cost curves, respectively. Our results support the
qualitative predictions of the theory. Large-buyer discounts are observed where predicted—in the
treatment with the concave total surplus function—and only where predicted.
The main deviation from theory is that the levels of certain bids differ from the theoretical
predictions. Structural estimates of a formal model of inequality aversion provide evidence that
preferences for fairness lead to some deviations from payoff maximization in the stage game,
but other factors including possibly computation errors or dynamic strategies in a repeated-game
context seem to be more important.
Some implications for real-world industries can be drawn from our experimental results.
According to our results, large-buyer discounts that stem from the bargaining theory we test
should arise in industries in which the seller’s cost function exhibits increasing marginal cost
(i.e., decreasing returns). Empirical estimates of cost functions provide examples of decreasing
returns, at least for large enough production levels, in residential water supply (Kim 1985),
electricity generation (Pollitt 1995), electricity distribution (Kwoka 2005), trucking (Spady and
Friedlaender 1978), and for some automobile manufacturers (Friedlaender, Winston, and Wang
1983). In industries with constant or increasing returns, alternative theories, including those
discussed in the Introduction, may account for any observed large-buyer discounts.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1 Suppose vi > max{Q≤X} MC(Q) for all i ∈ B. Consider any outcome
in which there are some buyers whose bids are not accepted by the seller; i.e., B − A, the
complement of A in B, is nonempty. Let i ∈ B − A. Buyer i earns zero profit in this outcome
since its bid per unit, pi , is rejected. If pi > max{Q≤X} MC(Q), the seller’s rejecting pi cannot
be subgame perfect. By accepting, the seller could increase its profit by


xi
  

 
1 
xj = xi pi −
MC k +
xj
pi xi − IC xi ,
x
i
j∈A
j∈A
k=1

> xi pi − max MC(Q) ,
{Q≤X}

which is positive by assumption.
Assume therefore that pi ≤ max{Q≤X} MC(Q). The buyer could raise so that it is in the
interval (max{Q≤X} MC(Q), vi). If the seller’s strategy is subgame perfect, it would accept such
a bid by the calculations in the previous paragraph. This bid would be profitable for the buyer
since it is strictly less than vi . Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2

Assume

MC(Q) ≥ MC(Q − 1) for all Q ∈ {1, 2, . . . , X}.

(A1)

To prove necessity, consider a set of buyer bids {pi |i ∈ B} forming a pure-strategy, subgameperfect equilibrium in which all buyers are served. If the seller deviates by rejecting buyer i’s
bid, its profit falls by
pi xi + C(X − xi ) − C(X) = xi [pi − AIC(xi, X − xi )].
For this deviation to be unprofitable, pi ≥ AIC(xi, X − xi ). An argument similar to the proof
of Proposition 1 shows that pi ≤ AIC(xi, X − xi ) or else buyer i could deviate by lowering
its price and be assured that this bid is still accepted. Combining these two inequalities yields
pi = AIC(xi, X − xi ). Finally, for buyer i not to deviate by dropping out of the market
(equivalently, bidding pi = 0), pi ≤ vi. This proves (2) must necessarily hold in a pure-strategy,
subgame-perfect equilibrium in which all buyers are served.
To prove sufficiency, suppose AIC(xi, X − xi) ≤ vi for all i ∈ B. Consider the proposed
equilibrium in which buyer i bids pi = AIC(xi, X − xi) for all i ∈ B and the seller accepts the
set of bids giving it the highest profit (in case of ties, assume the seller accepts the largest set of
such bids). We will argue that this proposed equilibrium is subgame perfect, and the seller serves
all the buyers. It is tautological that the seller’s strategy is part of a subgame-perfect equilibrium.
There remain two claims to be proved: first, that buyers have no incentive to deviate given the
seller’s strategy and second that the players’ strategies lead all buyers to be served. We will prove
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these claims in reverse order.
To show the seller’s strategy leads it to accept all bids, we have to show that the seller cannot
gain from rejecting a subset S ⊆ B of them. The change in the seller’s profit from so doing is

  


xi , X −
xi −
pi xi ≤
IC(xi, X − xi ) −
pi xi
IC
i∈S

i∈S

i∈S

i∈S

=



i∈S

xi [AIC(xi, X − xi ) − pi ].

i∈S

The first line holds by (A1). The second line holds by algebraic manipulation. The last expression
is zero since pi = AIC(xi, X − xi).
To show the buyers have no incentive to deviate given the seller’s strategy, note first that
buyers have no incentive to raise bids because they are all accepted in equilibrium. Buyer i has
no incentive to lower its bid since this would lead the seller to reject it by the argument in the
second paragraph above. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3

Assume marginal costs are strictly decreasing, i.e.,

MC(Q) < MC(Q − 1) for all Q ∈ {1, 2, . . . , X}.

(A2)

To prove necessity of the conditions in Proposition 3, consider a set of buyer bids {pi |i ∈ B}
forming a pure-strategy, subgame-perfect equilibrium in which all buyers are served. As argued
in the proof of Proposition 2, pi ≤ vi is a necessary condition. We then need to show that the two
inequalities in (3) are necessary conditions. The seller can deviate by rejecting a subset S ⊆ B
of buyer bids. For this deviation to be weakly unprofitable,

  
xi , X −
xi ≤
pi xi .
(A3)
IC
i∈S

i∈S

i∈S

Thus, the first inequality in (3) is a necessary condition.
To prove that the second inequality in (3) is also necessary, we will proceed in several steps.
The first step is to show that the seller makes zero
 profit in a subgame-perfect equilibrium in which
all buyers are served. Suppose to the contrary i∈B pi xi − C(X) > 0. Let pi = max{pj |j ∈ B}.
Then this highest-bidding buyer i can deviate to a lower bid pi − , where
⎧ ⎡
⎫
⎤
⎨
⎬
1 ⎣ 
1
⎦
pj xj − C(X) , {MC(Q − 1) − MC(Q)|Q = 1, 2, . . . , X}
(A4)
 = min
⎩ xi
⎭
2
j∈B−{i}

and still have it accepted. To see this, let S  be the set of buyers whose
 bids are accepted after
the deviation by i. The definition of  in (A4), in particular that  < [ j∈B−{i} pj xj − C(X)]/xi ,
implies that the seller continues to make strictly positive profit if it continues to accept all buyer
bids. Hence S  is nonempty. If i ∈ S  , then i’s deviating bid is accepted and we are done. If
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i ∈ S , then for all j ∈ S  ,
pi −  ≥ pj − 
 

xk − xj − 
≥ AIC xj ,

(A5)
(A6)

k∈S 

  
xk .
> AIC xi ,

(A7)

k∈S 

Condition (A5) holds since pi is the weakly highest bid. Condition (A6) holds since j ∈ S , so
accepting pj must give the seller a nonnegative profit at the margin. Condition (A7) holds since
 

 
 < MC
xk − MC 1 +
xk
(A8)
k∈S 

k∈S 


 
 
≤ AIC xj ,
xk − xj − AIC(xi,
xj .
k∈S 

(A9)

j∈S 

Condition (A8) holds by (A4). Condition (A9) holds because the average incremental cost of
producing a bundle is weakly less than the marginal cost of the first unit in the bundle and weakly
more than the last unit in the bundle by (A2). We have thus shown that i’s deviating price exceeds
the expression in (A7). But then the seller would gain from accepting buyer i’s bid in addition to
the bids in S . Hence buyer i’s deviating bid is profitable since it would be accepted. We have
thus established that the seller earns zero profit in a pure-strategy, subgame-perfect equilibrium
in which all buyers are served.

Combining the fact that i∈B pi xi = C(X) with the fact that (A3) must hold for the set
B − S, we have
 

pi xi ≤ C
xi .
i∈S

i∈S

Thus, the second inequality in (3) is a necessary condition for a pure-strategy, subgame-perfect
equilibrium in which all buyers are served.
To show sufficiency, consider a proposed equilibrium in which buyers bids are {pi |i ∈ B}
satisfying pi ≤ vi and condition (3) and in which the seller accepts the subset of bids giving it
the highest profit (in case of ties, assume the seller accepts the largest set of such bids). We will
argue that the proposed equilibrium is subgame perfect, and the seller serves all the buyers. It
is tautological that the seller’s strategy is part of a subgame-perfect equilibrium. There remain
two claims to be proved: first, that buyers have no incentive to deviate given the seller’s strategy
and second that the player’s strategies lead all buyers to be served. We will prove these claims
in reverse order. To show the seller’s strategy leads it to accept all bids, we have to show that
the seller cannot gain from rejecting a subset S ⊆ B of them. But this is ensured by the first
inequality in (3). To show that the buyers have no incentive to deviate given the seller’s strategy,
note first that buyers have no incentive to raise bids since they are all accepted in equilibrium.
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If buyer i deviates to a lower price pi < pi , for any subset of buyers S including i,


pi xi <
pi xi
pi xi +
i∈S

j∈S−{i}

≤ C




xi .

i∈S

The first line holds since pi < pi and the second by the second inequality of condition (3).
Therefore, it is better for the seller to reject all bids (giving it zero profit) rather than accepting
the bids in S. Since this is true for all S containing i, the deviating buyer’s bid would be rejected,
and so his deviation would be unprofitable. In sum, no buyer deviation would be accepted by
the seller, establishing sufficiency. Q.E.D.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for Buyer Bids
(a) All Rounds

(b) Last 30 Rounds

Mean

Median

Std. Dev.

Obs.

Mean

Median

Std. Dev.

Obs.

IMC Large Buyer
IMC Small Buyer

39.8
43.4

40.0
42.0

11.4
11.9

360
720

39.5
44.8

40.0
45.0

10.1
9.9

180
360

CMC Large Buyer
CMC Small Buyer

34.1
34.7

35.0
35.0

10.4
10.1

360
720

34.6
34.5

35.0
35.0

10.0
8.8

180
360

DMC Large Buyer
DMC Small Buyer

41.7
42.0

40.0
40.0

13.6
13.8

360
720

40.9
40.2

40.0
40.0

11.7
12.1

180
360

IMC Large Buyer
IMC Small Buyer

41.7
47.6

40.0
50.0

10.4
10.8

316
436

41.1
48.0

40.0
49.0

8.9
9.4

162
217

CMC Large Buyer
CMC Small Buyer

35.9
35.9

35.0
35.0

9.8
10.2

298
617

36.3
35.3

35.0
35.0

9.4
8.7

149
325

DMC Large Buyer
DMC Small Buyer

42.4
42.7

40.0
40.0

13.5
13.7

340
673

41.1
40.5

40.0
40.0

11.7
12.1

177
347

All Bids

Accepted Bids

Table 2: Buyer-Bid Regressions
All Buyer Bids
All Rounds
(a)

Accepted Buyer Bids

Last 30 Rounds
(b)

All Rounds
(c)

Last 30 Rounds
(d)

Constant

34.60∗∗∗
(1.22)

35.02∗∗∗
(1.14)

35.45∗∗∗
(1.22)

35.52∗∗∗
(1.12)

IMC

8.73∗∗∗
(1.32)

9.31∗∗∗
(1.17)

10.96∗∗∗
(1.39)

10.53∗∗∗
(1.29)

DMC

7.69∗∗∗
(1.72)

5.69∗∗∗
(1.56)

7.24∗∗∗
(1.74)

5.40∗∗∗
(1.52)

IMC × LARGE

−3.62∗∗∗
(0.88)

−4.84∗∗∗
(0.93)

−5.55∗∗∗
(1.09)

−5.81∗∗∗
(1.09)

CMC × LARGE

−0.08
(0.71)

−0.86
(0.69)

0.37
(0.75)

−0.33
(0.72)

DMC × LARGE

−1.11
(1.04)

−0.44
(0.90)

−0.83
(1.01)

−0.54
(0.90)

N

3, 240

1, 620

2, 680

1, 377

R2

0.09

0.12

0.11

0.14

Notes: Omitted treatment dummy is CMC, so coefficients on IMC and DMC reflect the difference between smallbuyer bids in these treatments and the CMC treatment. All columns are random-effects regressions accounting
for random buyer effects. Standard errors reported in parentheses below coefficient estimates are heteroskedasticityrobust (following White 1980) and are clustered by buyer. Coefficient significantly different from zero in a two-tailed
test at the ∗∗∗ one-percent level, ∗∗ five-percent level, ∗ ten-percent level. N is the number of observations.

Table 3: Comparison of Observed, Predicted, and Experimental-Best-Response Bids
Best Response to Others’
Experimental Behavior
Mean
Bid
(a)

Theoretical
Prediction
(b)

Monetary
Payoffs
(c)

Utility with
Fairness
(d)

IMC Large Buyer
IMC Small Buyer

39.5
44.8

37.0
60.0

37.0
54.8

36.9
53.4

CMC Large Buyer
CMC Small Buyer

34.6
34.5

20.0
20.0

36.8
33.3

37.6
34.2

DMC Large Buyer
DMC Small Buyer

40.9
40.2

∗
∗

25.5
18.6

26.3
19.9

Notes: Entries in columns (a), (c), and (d) based on data from last 30 rounds of play. Column (a) is taken from
Table 1. Column (b) is based on Figure 3. Column (c) is based on Figure 5. Column (d) computed multiplying
acceptance probabilities from Figure 4 by the utility function incorporating fairness using the parameters from part (b)
of Table 4. ∗ Theoretical prediction is not unique; can be any number in the interval [2.5, 37.5] with four unit bids
averaging 20.

Table 4: Structural Model of Seller Fairness
α̂

β̂

λ̂

N

(a) All Rounds
All Treatments

0.054
(0.066)

0.135∗∗∗
(0.068)

0.098∗∗∗
(0.008)

1, 080

IMC Treatment

0.022
(0.080)

0.098
(0.068)

0.132∗∗∗
(0.019)

360

CMC Treatment

0.035
(0.087)

0.549∗∗∗
(0.169)

0.098∗∗∗
(0.010)

360

DMC Treatment

0.223∗∗∗
(0.073)

0.399∗
(0.211)

0.076∗∗∗
(0.007)

360

All Treatments

0.068
(0.079)

0.133∗∗
(0.060)

0.130∗∗∗
(0.015)

540

IMC Treatment

0.013
(0.074)

0.161∗∗∗
(0.054)

0.197∗∗∗
(0.041)

180

CMC Treatment

0.086
(0.095)

1.028∗∗∗
(0.271)

0.100∗∗∗
(0.010)

180

DMC Treatment

0.220∗∗
(0.110)

0.106∗∗∗
(0.014)

180

(b) Last 30 Rounds

−0.411
(0.292)

Notes: Maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters in equation (4). N is the number of seller-round observations.
Standard errors reported in parentheses below coefficient estimates are heteroskedasticity-robust (following White
1980) and are clustered by seller. Coefficient significantly different from zero in a two-tailed test at the ∗∗∗ one-percent
level, ∗∗ five-percent level, ∗ ten-percent level.

Table 5: Buyer-Bid Dynamics
Interactions with Dummy
for First 30 Rounds
(a)

Interactions with Dummy
for Last 30 Rounds
(b)

(b) – (a)

Constant

0.290∗∗∗
(0.101)

0.120∗∗∗
(0.039)

−0.170∗
(0.094)

Bid Last
Round

0.082∗∗∗
(0.032)

0.063∗∗∗
(0.018)

−0.019
(0.022)

Bid Last Round Played
Same Treatment

0.367∗∗∗
(0.055)

0.191∗∗∗
(0.048)

−0.177∗∗∗
(0.064)

Bid Last Round Played Same
Treatment and Size Role

0.458∗∗∗
(0.060)

0.710∗∗∗
(0.045)

0.251∗∗∗
(0.065)

Rejection
Last Round

0.063∗∗∗
(0.018)

0.028∗∗∗
(0.011)

Rejection Last Round
Played Same Treatment

0.026
(0.023)

Rejection Last Round Played
Same Treatment and Size Role

0.134∗∗∗
(0.022)

−0.001
(0.018)
0.087∗∗∗
(0.012)

−0.035∗
(0.019)
−0.027
(0.026)
−0.047∗∗∗
(0.026)

Notes: Results from a single random-effects regression with 2,916 observations (324 observations lost in formation
of lagged variables) in which dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the buyer’s bid. Overall R2 is 0.78. The
three regressors involving lagged bids entered as natural logarithms; the three involving lagged seller rejections are
dummy variables. Standard errors reported in parentheses below coefficient estimates are heteroskedasticity-robust
(following White 1980) and are clustered by buyer. Coefficient significantly different from zero in a two-tailed test
at the ∗∗∗ one-percent level, ∗∗ five-percent level, ∗ ten-percent level.
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